Research on the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the improved availability of data. Researchers have addressed questions regarding the factors that influence bid-ask spreads and the relationship between spreads and risk, return and liquidity. Intra-day data have been used to measure the effective spread and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of liquidity to include the price impact of transactions on a trade-by-trade analysis.
Introduction
The development of international stock markets has produced an increasing number of innovations in investment vehicles. In particular, tax-transparent securities for real estate investment have been introduced in a number of stock markets. The arguments for their introduction include enhancing allocative efficiency. However, experience in the US suggests that the development of such vehicles (in particular Real Estate Investment Trusts, i.e. REITs) has also increased liquidity and has therefore contributed to an improved operational efficiency in real estate markets. The availability of trade-by-trade data in the US has facilitated research into the liquidity of trading in REITs but such data are not universally available and it may therefore not be possible to replicate the US research in international markets.
This paper seeks to establish the extent to which the primary results of Clayton and MacKinnon (2000) obtained using intra-day data can be replicated with daily returns. By employing less-finely defined data some information is lost. However, the loss is compensated by the ability to investigate longer periods of time and to address other relevant factors including the separation of size and market influences on liquidity.
We use daily US data over the period 1993 to 2005; a sample period which includes the two years covered by Clayton and MacKinnon (1993 and . An estimating equation based on daily data is derived and then applied to each year within the sample period. Because of the extended period used in this study, we are able to quantify changes in market liquidity over time and also to distinguish between the effect of company size and market. Having shown that our results are consistent with the findings of Clayton and MacKinnon we also examine the UK and Australian markets during the same sample period. The UK was chosen because it had a well developed securities market in property companies prior to the introduction of a REIT vehicle in 2007. Australia was chosen because it was the first international market (following the US) to introduce tax-transparent real estate vehicles (Listed Property Trusts) in 1971.
Previous Research
Liquidity has been extensively studied in equity markets. It can be argued that liquidity influences expected returns, either because investors might be prepared to pay a premium for liquid stocks when the market is down (Chordia et al., 2000 (Chordia et al., , 2001 or because, investors might perceive liquidity as a source of additional returns in different phases of markets (Acharya and Pedersen 2005 and Amihud, 2002) .
The connection between liquidity and the magnitude of the bid-ask spread is similarly well established; the larger the spread, the more expensive is trading in the stock. This, in turn, implies that investors would be inhibited in exploiting perceived mis-pricing or in making minor adjustments to their portfolio position, resulting in less trading and less liquidity. The connection between liquidity and the bid-ask spread in other stock markets has been demonstrated by Boothe (1988) and Gwilym, Clare and Thomas (1998) 4 .
However, the size of the bid-ask spread is but one component of liquidity; Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) argue that the spread only accounts for inventory costs, which are thought to be relatively minor compared with other costs of market making. For example, a market lacking depth would result in prices moving away from investors seeking to trade in larger quantities as market makers adjusted their bid-ask prices, even though the spread might remain unchanged (Kyle, 1985) .
Investors would therefore become aware that trading would be difficult in any large quantities in markets that lacked depth and might require a risk premium to compensate for this source of risk. In this framework, the bid-ask spread reflects the "tightness" aspect, i.e. the spread is only giving some indication of the costs in a short-term round trip transaction. Studies of the bid-ask spread have therefore assumed away the substantial minority of transactions that have taken place either within the spread or, perhaps for large trades, outside the quoted spread.
Derivation of Research Model
In assessing the behavior of stock-liquidity, Clayton and MacKinnon (2000) (hereafter C&M) concentrate their analysis on the change in stock price associated with the size of trade. This was a powerful approach to the problem, enabled by the researchers' access to trade-by-trade data. We start by applying the C&M model to aggregate daily price changes rather than to intra-day price changes.
The C&M model assumes a linear relationship between the change of price between two successive trades and (a) the volume of shares traded and (b) the difference between the direction of successive trades (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996) . This latter variable reflects the effective spread -if successive trades are in the same direction (e.g. retail buyer initiated), the computed difference would be zero. However, if the directions were different the variable would be either +2 or -2. The price change would therefore reflect (half) the effective price change between the market maker's bid and offer prices. On the question of volume, their model implies that a large buy order would shift market makers' prices upwards while small orders would have less effect.
Algebraically the price change relationship on a trade-by-trade basis is represented I t = 1 for retail investor's initiated buy and I t = -1 for retail investor's initiated sell transaction.
In this formulation, the lower the impact of large trades, the more liquid is the market. Thus over time, if the market were to become more liquid and deeper, it would be reflected in a smaller estimatedλ. C&M found that, for their REIT samples in 1993 and 1996, the market was more liquid in 1996 than in 1993. However as shown in equation (1), they were also testing for the effective bid-ask spread by the φ parameter. On the whole, they were unable to find evidence that the φ parameter changed significantly between 1993 and 1996. C&M also found that changes in liquidity were most obvious in REITs that were, or became, self advised and self managed.
C&M concluded that their study had demonstrated the value of intra-day data and their results advanced the study of liquidity assessment significantly. However, what remains unknown is whether their results derive entirely from the use of the intra-day data or whether the changes in liquidity they document would have been revealed with the aggregated daily data that might be more widely available in other international markets).
In our sample we are using daily returns and daily transaction volume, therefore a natural question is to ask what would happen if we were to take the aggregate of daily trades using the above formulation. Summing equation (1) 
The LHS of equation (2) equals the price change (or return) over the day. The first variable on the RHS sums to the total net transactions in the day and the second term represents the sum of transactions indicators. Since every transaction apart from the first and last appears twice with the opposite sign, all intermediate transaction indicators cancel except for the first and last. In the absence of new information, the expected daily price change would arise from trade changing direction; that is, the opening trade taking place at the bid (ask) price and the closing trade taking place at the ask (bid) price .
We therefore can rewrite equation (2) 
which reflects the argument that φ is the estimated parameter for the difference between the trades that occur between open and close. The λ term indicates the effect of trading volumes on price movements during the course of the day.
To distinguish between market liquidity in response to net sales and purchases we create dummy variables to capture positive and negative price movements which will allow asymmetrical responses to changes in market direction. In addition, since we are using price indices, the absolute changes in prices are replaced by relative price changes in the form of log returns 5 . Our estimated regression therefore takes the form of In terms of simple market economics, we can envisage a highly elastic demand curve for stock at the current price, some of which is provided by the market maker but the bulk of which is provided by other investors. If the market lacks depth, investors wishing to trade may find that the price has to move more to encourage buyers or sellers to enter the market. Thus, they will face a downward sloping demand curve if they wish to sell and an upward sloping supply curve if they wish to buy. This suggests that additional depth in the market may allow investors to trade without the market price changing. In contrast, information flows may result in price changes without significant trading. We distinguish between upward and downward price movements because of evidence in many markets that liquidity is asymmetrical (see Madhaven and Sofianos, 1998 and Chung et al., 1999) . In particular, Escribano and Pascual (2005) show that for the NYSE, the adjustment to trading is not symmetrical but that increased volatility in stock price returns tends to lead to greater symmetry in the bid-ask spread.
The upward and downward price changes are given respectively by equations (5) and (6) ( )
The estimated slopes (λ i ) represent the market depth; the smaller the absolute slope, the more liquid is the market and the more stock the market can absorb or supply at a price that does not differ much from the current price. The intercept terms (α i ) provide some insight into the transaction costs in the market since the sum of the absolute values of the α shows the minimum difference between buy and sell orders (see Figure 1) . It thus corresponds to the estimate by C&M of the effective spreads cost and we hereafter use the symbol α to refer to the sum of the absolute values of the intercepts.
[ INSERT FIGURE 1] 
US Data
Daily price changes, trading volumes and the market membership of 184 US REITs were obtained from SNL Financials. Bid and ask prices were obtained from Reuters for a smaller sample of US REITs which we use only for comparative purposes.
The bid-ask spread for REIT i at time t is calculated as follows:
where PB i,t and PA i,t respectively represent the bid and ask price for company i at time t. Throughout the period of study (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) new REITs were being introduced into the market. Since we were running regressions for each calendar year, we added new companies to the data set only when there were at least 60 data points for the year of entry in order to provide reasonably robust parameter estimates. We report annual average estimates of coefficients, along with the R 2 of the regression and the number of REITs available in that particular year. If all REITs have a full time series for all variables, the maximum number of regressions would be 2,392 for the overall sample (184 REITs * 13 years). Since all 184 REITs are not part of the sample for the entire period, we are able to run only 1,618 regressions. For each year the available number of estimated equations is reported in the last column of Table 2 . This column can be compared with the last column of Table 1 , which contains the total number of REITs existing in our sample for each year.
Observations and Hypotheses
US real estate sector returns are illustrated in Figure 2 , which shows the performance of our sample of REITS, relative to the overall equity market. As can [
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ]
In Figure 3 we show reported spreads for REITs from 1991 onwards. Note that spreads peaked in 1993. This result is consistent with the finding of C&M that liquidity increased between 1993 and 1996. In fact, the change appears to have taken place early in that interval because reported spreads fell sharply in 1994.
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE ] Previous research has concluded that, after a rise at the end of the 1980s, spreads fell in the 1990s (Nelling et al., 1995) . However, it has also been shown that average REITs spreads fell from 1993 to 1996, not because there was a general reduction in REIT spreads, but because new REITs appeared that were more liquid than the existing REITs (see Cole, 1998) .
From the previous work and from the above discussion we therefore would expect to observe the following: 
NYSE vs. other markets:
The NYSE should be more liquid than the other markets (ASE and NASDAQ 6 ). In exploring this question, we have to deal with the complication that large cap REITs would be expected to be more liquid than small cap REITs and that the market effect might therefore be confused with a size effect. We therefore include in our analysis some further exploration of the size vs.
market effects. Ideally, we would like to test whether the NASDAQ effects were different from the other markets but the sample of NASDAQ stocks was insufficiently large to make meaningful comparisons 7 .
Effective spreads (α) and reported spreads: The estimates of effective spreads,
represented by the sum of the absolute values of the intercepts, from equation (4), would be related to the bid-ask spreads reported by Reuters 8 .
Regression Results
Before reporting the regression results, we first consider alternative interpretations of the regressions. For example, although we are regressing returns on volume, it might be thought that the direction of influence runs from returns to volume. In support of our interpretation, Clark (1973) , Karpoff (1987) , Tauchen and Pitts (1983) argue that trading volume proxies for the flow of new information and the level of disagreement between traders (which we identify with market depth). For an interesting extension of their work, see Rodgers et al. (2001) .
Notwithstanding the thrust of previous research, as a precautionary step we first conduct Granger causality tests on individual stock returns and trading volume.
The results showed little of significance. Of the 2,762 Granger regression tests, 12.9 percent suggested that daily volume Granger-caused daily returns, while 9.7 percent suggested that daily returns Granger-caused daily volume (at the 95 percent confidence level). Only in 1995, did we find more instances of returns Granger-causing volume (14.8 percent) than volume causing returns (11.5 percent). The Granger-causality results suggest that this was not a dominant issue that affected stock prices in the sample used in this study. Table 2 summarizes the results of estimating the regression shown in equation (4) for each year from 1993 to 2005 for our sample of US REITs. Note that over time the intercepts (α) move closer to each other, implying declining spreads in the market over the period. For both positive and negative intercepts the sharpest reduction is from 1993 to 1994, which is consistent with the findings of C&M. For the market depth coefficients (λ) both of the slopes become flatter over the sample period signifying improving market depth. There is some asymmetry in the slopes; the positive slope is generally greater in absolute terms than the negative slope.
Market Spreads and Market Depth 1993 onward
This implies that retail investors' buying pressure causes more price movement than retail investors' selling pressure. The only two exceptions occur in 2002 and 2004 and by then both upward and downward price sensitivity has declined by more than 50% compared with their values in the 1990s. The slope asymmetry therefore tends to disappear when the market depth improves.
[
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Although there is substantial variation among the regression results for each company, the strength of the regressions is clearly indicated by the average adjusted R 2 for the regressions, which are all larger than 55 percent. The daily data are noisy and we would not expect the regressions to explain variation in returns very strongly. We calculated the proportion of significant estimates for this regression and show the results in Table 3 . It is interesting to note that in the early part of the sample period, the results were strongly significant in the majority of cases. As time progressed, however, the slopes of the regressions decreased and thus it is not surprising that the proportion of significant parameters also declined.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

New vs. Old REITs
The next issue we examine is the relative liquidity of the new and old REITs. We first divided our sample into the REITs that existed before 1993 and those that have appeared since that year. We then estimated equation (4) for both samples.
The results are reported in the form of differences in intercepts and slopes for new and old REITs. In Table 4 , the positive intercepts for new REITs are almost always lower than for older REITs (except in two years when they are equal). In contrast, the negative intercepts are always lower in absolute terms for new REITs, implying smaller effective spreads for new REITs. The slopes of new REITS are also consistently smaller in absolute terms than for old REITs suggesting that the market is deeper for newer REITs.
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] Furthermore, consistent with prior research, we noted that older REITs have shown more variation in liquidity over the sample period. In contrast, new REITs are more liquid and less affected by year-to-year changes in market conditions.
NYSE vs. other markets
The final question we examine for US REITs is the relative liquidity of different markets. As mentioned above, we would have liked to distinguish between the NASDAQ and other markets. However, we had only 8 stocks quoted on the NASDAQ so instead we divided our sample into NYSE and all other markets and estimated equation (4) for both sub-samples. The estimates conform closely to our expectations (see Table 5 ). NYSE REITs appear to have lower effective spreads and greater liquidity throughout the period.
[INSERT (1) the estimated market depth parameter (λ, the sum of the absolute slopes) and (2) the estimated effective spread (α, the sum of the absolute intercepts), against a market dummy (NYSE=1), firm size (represented by the log of total assets), and the interaction between market and size as follows:
The results from this estimation are presented in Table 6 . Turning first to the regression of market depth (equation 7a), we note that in every year (apart from 2003) NYSE stocks were more liquid than non-NYSE stocks and large stocks were more liquid than small stocks. However the effect of size was not relevant for NYSE stocks because there was no significant difference between the coefficient β 3 and the absolute value of the coefficient β 2 10 . In other words, we find that once a REIT is listed on the NYSE, the size of the firm does not matter because the market will guarantee the existence of analysts looking at that company and hence 9 There were insufficient observations of the non-NYSE REITs before 2001 to include earlier years. 10 We performed the Wald test and in none of the reported regressions was the difference significant at the 10% level.
its liquidity. This result has also a wider implication for other international markets. Having demonstrated the robustness of the use of aggregate daily data, we now apply it to two other markets; the UK and Australia. The UK was chosen because it has had a significant sector of quoted real estate securities for a long time period.
The Australian market was selected because it was the second country (after the US) to introduce tax-transparent real estate vehicles. We first present the UK results.
Application of Model to UK Property Companies
To show the robustness of our liquidity estimation technique, we collected aggregate daily data from the UK market for the 37 major property companies 
Application of Model to Australian LPTs
Australian Listed Property Trusts were established in 1971 and now account for more than 10% of the capitalization of the Australian stock market. In recent years, they have experienced both expansion and a wave of mergers and takeovers but their aggregate performance has been better than that recorded by the overall market. In the five year period ending 2005, the sector achieved more than twice the total return of the rest of the market. [ INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE ] Table 8 presents the results of the estimation of equation (4) [ INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
Comparison of Reported Spreads and Estimated Effective Spreads.
The results of the analysis using aggregate daily data in the US were shown to be consistent with previous research using trade-by-trade data. Although the regression results reveal changes in the UK and Australian markets, there might appear to be little evidence that the results reflect what had been observed or reported in the two markets. Mindful of this issue, we wanted to compare the estimates from the regressions with publicly available data and the obvious source was reported bid-ask spreads. As mentioned in the data sourcing, we had collected closing bid-ask spreads for a sample of US REITs and we also collected closing bid-ask spreads for the UK and Australian markets.
There is some difficulty with collecting bid-ask spreads because where recorded, they are often taken at the close of trading and may be very noisy equivalents of typical spreads throughout the day. Accordingly we averaged the reported bid-ask spreads for each company-year in order to compare them with the effective spreads estimated in equation (4). We then regressed the effective spread against the reported spread and the results are shown in Table 9 .
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] As can be seen, the results are significant -effective spreads estimated from aggregate daily returns are positively related to reported spreads. The weakest relationship is between the US reported spreads and our estimates. This results from two different factors. First, the US market is more liquid than other markets and therefore the effective spread might be less than the reported spread with more transactions taking place within the spread during the day. Second, the sample of REITs for which we were able to collect spreads was smaller than the sample used in the main regression analysis.
The Australian market had the strongest relationship between the two spreads (with an adjusted R-squared of over 90%) but the effective spread actually was greater than the reported spread. This may suggest that the market depth for Australian LPTs is thinner than the market depth for US REITs and UK property companies. Nevertheless, it would appear that the daily return model is capturing information that is to some extent reflected in transaction-level data as well as official spread-based information.
Conclusions
Data availability inhibits research on international market microstructure. However, in this paper we develop a simple technique of estimating liquidity using aggregate daily stock price returns that appears to be consistent with the results of previous research obtained using intra-day data. Although we do not argue that our technique is superior to the use of intra-day data, our results are consistent with those of previous research. Moreover, our findings shed light upon the behavior of market liquidity or market depth over the relatively long period since 1993.
More specifically we show that liquidity improved dramatically from 1993 to 1994 in the US REIT sector. As previous researchers have suggested, the improvements resulted largely from the introduction of new REITs. The degree of liquidity is related to both the size of REITs and the market in which their stocks are traded.
The NYSE appeared to offer more liquidity than might have been expected; even after controlling for the size of companies traded on the NYSE.
track the liquidity of the new vehicles. The results presented in this paper suggest that daily returns can be utilized to replicate the results of more detailed studies of trade-by-trade data. We do not claim to offer superior insights into the liquidity of developing markets. However, we conclude that daily data (which is more accessible and manageable than trade-by-trade data) can be used to reveal dynamic changes in market microstructure over a wider range of markets than have so far been studied. 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 
Appendix 2: Tables
No. REITs Volumes ($) Returns
Source: SNL Financials. Yearly average of daily returns and aggregate daily volumes of each trust in the US REIT sample. The cross-sectional standard deviation is calculated as the standard deviation of average daily returns of each REIT for each year. The table reports the yearly average estimates of the regressions of equation (4) represented above. In each year 1993-2005 the daily price change of each US REIT is regressed against a constant (α 0 ), two dummy variables representing days with respectively positive (α 1 ) and negative (α 2 ) price change (we assume the former to refer to days where the aggregate daily trading volumes initiated by buyer exceed the ones initiated by sellers), aggregate daily trading volumes (λ 0 ) and an interaction between each of the two dummy variables and trading volumes (respectively (λ 1 , λ 2 ). The α and λ parameters respectively represent the average of the estimated effective bidask spreads and the average of the estimated market depth coefficients. The averages reported were for the number of regressions reported each year. Source of data: SNL Financials. 
Lambda Dummy
The table summarizes the proportion of significant α and λ parameter estimates for the regressions of daily returns against trading volumes for each US REIT reported in Table 2 . Source of data: SNL Financials. 
New REITs
Lambda dummy Dummy
Note: There were 50 old REITs used in the sample for comparative purposes.
The table is constructed by running the regressions of equation (4) for (a) old REITs and (b) new REITs and reporting the average difference between the estimated coefficients for the α and λ terms. There are 13 sets of results; 11 of the positive estimated α intercepts (average of the estimated effective bid-ask spreads) are of the correct sign, whilst all of the negative estimated α intercepts are of the correct sign. All the λ coefficients (average of the estimated market depth coefficients) are also of the correct sign. If there were no systematic difference between the new and the old REITs, the probability of observing 2 or less contrary observations from a sample size of 13 would be 1.1% so the results reported in the table would seem very robust. Regressions were run on daily returns against trading volumes for each US REIT in each year 1993-2005. The averages reported were for the number of regressions reported each year. Source of data: SNL Financials. (4) for (a) NYSE REITs and (b) non-NYSE REITs and reporting the average difference between the estimated coefficients for the α and λ terms. As in the preceding table, the differences between the parameter estimates for the NYSE and non-NYSE markets are all in the expected direction. The results would seem to be robust to the conclusion that NYSE offers more liquidity than the other markets. For each year, the averages of the estimated λ (Panel A) and α (Panel B) coefficients across the REITs are regressed against a dummy variable to distinguish between stock exchange (DNYSE being equal to 1 if the market is NYSE, 0 otherwise), market capitalization (size) and an interaction term (DNYSE * size). (4) represented above. In each year 1993-2005 the price change of each UK property company is regressed against a constant (α 0 ), two dummy variables representing days with respectively positive (α 1 ) and negative (α 2 ) price change (we assume the former to refer to days where the aggregate daily trading volumes initiated by buyer exceed the ones initiated by sellers), aggregate daily trading volumes (λ 0 ) and an interaction between each of the two dummy variables and trading volumes (respectively (λ 1 , λ 2 ). The α and λ parameters respectively represent the average of the estimated effective bid-ask spreads and the average of the estimated market depth coefficients. The averages reported were for the number of regressions reported each year. Source of data: Thomson Datastream. 
Market
Regression tests Coefficients
The table reports the estimates of the regression of the absolute sum of effective bid-ask spreadssum of α 1 and α 2 coefficients in equation (4) 
